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Ping Li, a US citizen who immigrated to the US from China, has been charged with conspiring to act as an agent of the People’s Republic of China without notification to the Attorney General.
Li worked for Verizon for more than 20 years and most recently worked for InfoSys, an
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Ping Li, a US citizen who immigrated to the US from China, has been charged with conspiring to act as an agent of the People’s Republic of China without notification to the Attorney General.
Li worked for Verizon for more than 20 years and most recently worked for InfoSys, an India-based IT company.
From as early as 2012, Li served as a cooperative contact working at the direction of officers of 🇨🇳 MSS to obtain information of interest to the 🇨🇳 government. Li obtained a wide variety information at the request of the MSS, including information concerning Chinese dissidents and pro-democracy advocates, members of the Falun Gong religious movement, and US-based NGOs, and to report that information to the MSS. Li also provided the MSS with information obtained from his employers. Li used a variety of anonymous online accounts for the purpose of communicating with the MSS, and traveled to China to meet with the MSS.
In Aug 2012, an MSS officer requested that Li provide information about practitioners of Falun Gong and pro-democracy advocates in the US. Less than a week after receiving this request, Li sent the name and biographical information of an individual affiliated with Falun Gong residing in St. Petersburg, Florida.
In Mar 2015, an MSS officer requested information from Li about branch offices that Li’s employer, a major US telecommunications company, had opened in China. Li responded with the requested information three weeks later.
In Mar 2017, an MSS officer requested a training instruction plan from Li. In Apr 2017, Li responded indicating that he had uploaded materials to an online account that he shared with the MSS officer and asked the MSS officer to delete the materials after reading them.
In May 2021, an MSS officer requested information from Li concerning hacking events targeting US companies, including a widely publicized hacking of a major US company by the 🇨🇳 government. Within four days, Li responded with the requested information.
In Mar 2022, an MSS officer requested from Li information concerning Li’s new employer InfoSys , as well as materials relating to cybersecurity training. That same day, Li sent the requested information about his employer as well as materials relating to cybersecurity training.
In June 2022, an MSS officer requested from Li information concerning an individual who, according to the officer, had resided in China but fled to the US, and the name and suspected residential address in the US of that individual. That same day, Li responded with information about the owners of that residential address.
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